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Replacing the “View from Nowhere”: 
A Pragmatist-Feminist Science Classroom 
by 
Sarah Marie Stitzlein 
University of New Hampshire 
 
Teachers and Problematic Philosophies of Science 
Few people would contest the importance of science teachers having an understanding of 
and appreciation for the history and philosophy of science. Teachers’ beliefs in these areas of 
their profession influence their behavior when teaching science and when implementing 
approaches to science outlined in curricular and pedagogical guides (King, 1991; Pajares, 1992). 
In this way, the teachers’ philosophies of science effect their doing, or sociology, of science. 
While they tend to retain certain buzzwords from their science methods courses that are linked to 
philosophical positions, such as “student-centered” and “hands-on”, some teachers do not 
maintain new epistemological orientations toward science introduced in philosophy of science 
courses, if they enroll in these courses at all (Levitt, 2002; Lederman, 1992). In other cases, 
teachers have consciously tried to enact new philosophies in their classrooms, but revert to their 
old ways when confronted with difficult situations or when confronted with content new to them 
(Wallace & Louden, 2000). In still other cases, teachers are unaware of the underlying 
philosophy of science guiding their teaching and inadvertently adopt the positivistic stance that 
dominates popular images of science and its history. For unclear reasons, progress in philosophy 
of science has historically been slow to reach the classroom. Instead, classroom practice often 
continues to adhere to outdated and problematically founded understandings of science— 
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Those teachers who acknowledge holding a traditional view of science—a considerable 
proportion of teachers—describe it as “objective, empirical, and involved with issues of the 
control of nature” (Pomeroy, 1993, p. 269). Correlatively, they view science as a collection of 
proven facts (Aguirre, Haggerty, and Linder, 1990) and understand their role in the science 
classroom as distributors of these facts (Tilgner, 1990; Gallagher, 1991). This notion of science 
renders them local authorities, as they are the only participants in the classroom who dispense the 
timeless truths of science. Admittedly, science as a stream of factual truths independent of 
human influence can be a practically preferred form of knowledge in schools, popular culture, 
and elsewhere. It packages the truths of the world as easily transferable commodities: they travel 
well in texts, transfer well into notes, and test easily. 
In this paper I will delineate this popular, though often unacknowledged or 
misappropriated, philosophy of science in terms of the “view from nowhere”. Like many before 
me, I believe that thorough, accurate, and useful science education requires a refined 
understanding of philosophy of science on the part of the science teacher (King, 1991; Gallagher, 
1991; Ryan & Aikenhead, 1992). This article explains problems with the dominant philosophy 
underpinning many classrooms and attempts to flesh out an improved one. In part, I analyze 
teachers’ philosophies of science by studying their classroom practice. This sociological 
perspective allows me to see how guiding theories do and do not play out in the doing of science 
within the classroom.  
Admittedly, the process of encouraging some teachers to critically examine their own 
philosophies of science and introducing them to this new approach in an understandable and 
sustainable way is far from easy. My purpose here, rather, is to lay a theoretical grounding for an 
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improved philosophy and to offer a rough sketch of some of the ways in which it might take 
shape in the classroom. Hopefully my argument will persuade teachers and teacher educators 
who cling to the view from nowhere, consciously or not, to rethink their philosophical 
framework. My intent is not to abandon these teachers upon saying their view is mistaken, but 
rather to suggest and illustrate a more robust alternative. In particular, I offer pragmatistfeminism 
as an area of scholarship which is sensitive to their local concerns, while intent on 
fleshing out a useful philosophy of science driven by social justice and human need to live in and 
know the world well. 
The Rise of Aperspectival Objectivity 
The “view from nowhere” expressed by Thomas Nagel in 1986 is indicative of a notion 
of objectivity that has developed since the Baconian revolution of science in the 1700’s. It 
continues to operate as the dominant framework for conceiving science in the science classroom, 
despite having been discounted by most contemporary philosophers of science. The Baconian 
revolution called for an impartial approach to discovering facts of an absolute reality, which 
eventually grew into a concern with standardizing scientific inquiries through the use of the 
scientific method in the 1800’s. More recently, objectivity has been conceived as aperspectival 
and devoid of human biases (Daston, 1994; Solomon, 1998). This notion is most closely aligned 
with the type of objectivity that we see operating in Nagel’s work. Through pedagogical, 
curricular, and sociological analyses of classrooms, aspects of each historical conception of 
objectivity, and especially that promoted by Nagel, become evident. I argue that the conception 
of objectivity as the view from nowhere cannot and should not be maintained in the science 
classroom any longer. 
Nagel presents the view from nowhere as a method of understanding that is the ideal 
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framework for approaching epistemological and scientific endeavors. This notion is primarily 
concerned with reaching a perspective that is not tied to humanness, values, or the world as we 
interpret it. Hence, it attempts to achieve a standpoint for explaining the world that is detached 
from any particular perspective. Operating under a correspondence theory of truth, it aims to 
mechanistically match descriptions of reality with supposed actual states of affairs, regardless of 
whether these accounts make sense with lived experience. The view from nowhere strives to see 
the world in all of its objective, absolute reality and, thus, to derive impartial truths. Nagel does 
admit that, as humans who necessarily interpret the world through filters of experience and 
preferences, we are never completely able to overcome some aspects of our subjectivity and 
therefore can never totally achieve objectivity. Nonetheless, he maintains that we should strive 
to achieve the most objective standpoint we can by continually repeating the process of 
detaching ourselves from any particular perspective as we practice science. 
Many teachers, some consciously and others inadvertently, have adopted similar beliefs 
regarding science and objectivity, asserting that science is absolute, factual, and not subject to 
creativity or values (King, 1991; Pomeroy, 1993; Dickinson, et al., 2000). A large portion 
believe science education should be geared toward “discovery learning”—that being discovery 
of the facts which compose objective reality (Abell & Smith, 1992; Gustafson, 1995; Skamp & 
Mueller, 2001). They also believe good science is free from human biases and emotions. In 
these ways, they uphold the view from nowhere as the best approach to objective science. A 
large number of teachers have accepted this stance without critically examining the 
epistemological and ontological assumptions it entails. 
Many feminists would argue that those teachers are adopting a stance that is incompatible 
with their lived experience. Striving to achieve this ideal objectivity entails a belief in 
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disembodied, aperspectival knowledge that most feminists argue is simply not possible. 
Traditional empiricists hold that the subjects of knowledge are supposed to be transhistorical, 
homogeneous, unitary, and disembodied. Many feminists, however, believe that people (the 
subjects of knowledge), the objects of knowledge, and knowledge itself are always socially and 
historically located and are, therefore, tied to embodied existence and embodied ways of 
knowing (Harding, 1993). Additionally, they recognize and appreciate differences amongst 
perspectives. 
If teachers consider the ways in which they have come to know the world, I believe they 
will discover that knowledge largely stems from bodily experience and transaction of 
information between people, rather than through a process of distancing their thought processes 
from themselves in accord with an often narrowly defined method. They may also find that the 
knowledge which they value most does not necessarily correspond to an absolute reality, but is 
that which is most useful in their attempts to lead the best lives possible in the world as they 
experience it. In this way knowledge and value are not fully distinguishable. If credence is 
granted to this argument, objectivity as an aperspectival approach to discovering facts about an 
absolute reality is overturned as nonsensical and not necessarily of use for living well in the 
present or foreseeable future. 
According to most feminists and some pragmatists, the acknowledgment of both subject 
and object as historically and politically situated requires that the subjects and objects of 
knowledge be placed on a more level playing field. When this is done, objectivity, as a form of 
responding to the rights and well being of fellow subjects as well as the objects of scientific 
inquiry, must be considered (Heldke & Kellert, 1995). Objectivity, then, is achieved to the 
extent that responsibility in inquiry is fulfilled and expanded. It follows that scientists must be 
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held accountable for the results of their projects and that scientists must acknowledge the 
political nature of their work. Objectivity understood as such implies relationships between 
people, objects, and inquiry projects as central to its conception (Sullivan, 2001). 
This understanding differs greatly from the view of science operating in the curricular 
and pedagogical practices of many teachers. Those teachers tend to emphasize technical 
knowledge that describes sets of evidence or events in precise, mechanistic, and reductionistic 
ways and ultimately attempts to exercise controlling power over the environment (Pomeroy, 
1993). This type of knowledge typically follows from an observation of or experimentation 
upon an object and, hence, there is no equal or reciprocal interaction between the inquiring 
subject and the object of inquiry (Oliver, 1990). Further, as Matthew Weinstein (2001) points 
out, the National Science Education Standards themselves focus almost entirely on the role and 
perspective of the scientist in the classroom. Thus, they exclude the interests and perspectives of 
the objects with which they work and the other people involved in their larger inquiry project (p. 
231). 
By adhering to these standards, teachers present science as an activity done for and by 
scientists only. It can be implied from the stereotypical and disproportionate group of scientists 
employed in our country, that this is a project for a select group of highly intelligent white men 
in lab coats. Students as young as kindergarten and practicing teachers have been shown to 
portray scientists along these stereotypes (Barman, 1997). The word ‘scientist’ itself is packed 
with prestige and power, a self-concept differing greatly from, for example, a shy eighth grade 
science student interested in how the local water table affects the cleanliness of tap water in her 
neighborhood. This child may feel isolated from the community of inquirers. She may think her 
project is insignificant compared to those of ‘real’ scientists—despite the fact that her work may 
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improve the health of people, animals, and water life in her area. 
Insights from Pragmatist-Feminism 
Philosopher Richard Bernstein (1991) describes the ethos of pragmatism as revolving 
around “the themes of anti-foundationalism, fallibilism, the social character of the self and the 
regulative ideal of a critical community, contingency, and pluralism” (p. 338). This social spirit 
concerns concrete issues in the world, including oppression, and theorizes them from plural 
locations while also experimenting with them in specific contexts. It is a framework compatible 
with the larger aura of science insofar as it inductively forms theory from experience and tests 
theory in experience in attempt to solve problems in the world. With a substantial history in 
educational theory, pragmatism links education and science as essential to good living. Within 
education, pragmatists focus on the habits of good living which students develop; these include 
habitual attitudes toward and responses to science. 
While hard to define feminism as a whole, many elements of feminist thinking 
compliment and extend the pragmatic approach. Feminists also share concerns with practical 
problems, particularly those of oppression, existing in the world. They encourage social 
exploration and theoretical explanation of these problems from a variety of positioned 
perspectives. Of particular note, feminists argue for pluralism by drawing attention to the unique 
perspectives of women as well as the mediated experiences of people inhabiting all perspectives. 
Extending pragmatic concerns with the contexts of problems and theorizing, “Feminism cogently 
and extensively shows how gender, race, class, and sexual preference are crucial parts of context 
that philosophy has traditionally neglected” (Seigfried, 1996, p. 39). The pragmatic ethos guides 
feminist questions about inequity, social responsibility, and promoting satisfactory living for all 
people in all situations. 
                           Electronic Journal of Science Education, Vol. 9, No. 2, December, 2004 
 
 
While both traditions overlap in these ways, pragmatist-feminists consciously combine 
the two so as to magnify and apply the pragmatic outlook to feminist concerns and vice versa. 
When combined, pragmatism and feminism work together to provide a robust philosophy for 
interpreting the world, including the world of science and the value of objectivity it upholds. It 
forms a unique, socially responsible framework for understanding science as well as an intricate 
connection to education as a simultaneous site of real-world problem solving. Importantly, 
pragmatist-feminism promotes working hypotheses rather than adherence to strict rules, for the 
former allows for growth and change when the philosophical approach proves to no longer be 
satisfactory (Sullivan, 2002, p. 230). 
Delineating the pragmatic notion of truth central to pragmatist-feminism will be helpful 
for understanding its appropriateness as a replacement framework for the science classroom. 
Moreover, this criterion for truth and the more robust sense of objectivity I will later describe 
show how this scientific framework differs from more general social constructionist approaches. 
Unlike the “view from nowhere” system which holds a correspondence theory of truth, 
pragmatists believe ideas become true insofar as they ‘work’ for us, profitably combine our 
experiences, and lead us to further experiences that satisfy our needs. Pragmatists, like William 
James and John Dewey, are concerned with the concrete differences in our lived experiences that 
an idea’s being true will make. Unlike the correspondence theory of truth that underlies 
empiricism, “pragmatic truth is not the agreement of proposition with reality, but an expression 
of the anticipated or actual successful completing of a worthwhile leading” (Haddock Seigfried, 
1990, p. 294). 
Truth is something which occurs when the goals of human flourishing are satisfied, at 
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least temporarily. Pragmatic objectivity, then, comes to concern embodied and dynamic 
relationships between people and the world in which they live and cannot be strictly confined to 
absolute and unchanging truths. This is an enticing framework which compliments lived 
experience and is aligned with social justice goals—values of good living which cannot be 
completely distinguished from factual knowledge of the world. It is my hope that science 
teachers concerned with improving the world as well as their students’ knowledge of it, will find 
it compelling. 
Thus far, it has become evident that pragmatist-feminists call the role of perspective into 
play. They disavow the possibility of a transcended view from nowhere, existing as disembodied 
and transhistorical. Interestingly, the feminists’ focus on perspective was nearly historically 
paralleled by developments in science itself, such as relativity theory and the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle, which also called the existence of an observer-independent standpoint into 
question (Crowder & Warburton, 1995; Roth, 2000). Some feminists with pragmatic concerns, 
like Lisa Heldke and Stephen Kellert, hung on to the conception of objectivity as independent of 
a particular perspective, but instead suggested that objectivity is best achieved by actually 
including a maximum number of concrete perspectives (1995, p. 372). Pragmatist-feminists like 
these fashion objectivity through interdependencies among multiple and diverse perspectives, 
while maintaining rigor and critical capacities. 
Concerns with the inclusion of multiple perspectives can be traced to Sandra Harding’s 
early work on feminist standpoint epistemology (1986, 1993, 1994) that supports a different 
notion of objectivity. With roots in the Hegelian master/slave relationship, feminist standpoint 
theorists argue that women, as oppressed people, are able to notice the oppressor’s failure to 
fully achieve his or her proclaimed objectivity. Often, these women are able to point out the 
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andocentric and sexist underpinnings that affect the results of scientific studies. Science, then, 
would benefit by beginning from the lives of women in that they could contribute the pluralistic 
and diverse viewpoints needed to unmask the harmful prejudices acting in some scientific 
endeavors. Interestingly, some students already hold similar views as indicated by a 1992 survey 
of high school students in which 11% agreed with the statement, “women would make somewhat 
different discoveries because, by nature or by upbringing, females have different values, 
viewpoints, perspectives, or characteristics such as sensitivity toward consequences” (Ryan & 
Aikenhead, p. 569). While not entirely expressing Harding’s view that the oppressed have a 
more objective stance than the oppressor, these students do show an inkling that women, as a 
uniquely positioned group, may have key insights and traits to lend science by virtue of their 
position. 
Feminist standpoint epistemologists argue that women’s experiences provide the 
foundation from which important scientific questions rise and that women can be a starting point 
for achieving maximal objectivity. Although Harding acknowledges the situatedness and 
valueladenness of the human perspective, she still maintains a conception of objectivity in her 
early work that is more closely aligned with that of traditional empiricism. She believes that a 
more clear, representationalist, vision of the world can be uncovered by starting from the lives of 
women. Nonetheless, science can profit by starting from the lives of the oppressed and this 
aspect of the feminist standpoint theorists’ understanding of objectivity, one in accord with 
pragmatic situated pluralism, will be useful for constructing a new, pragmatist-feminist notion. 
Many science teachers uphold the scientific method as a procedure for maximizing 
objectivity through overcoming human values, emotions, and opinions (Harding 1993; Gardner, 
1998). They tend to see the world of science as hierarchical and competitive, where the most 
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objective and value free scientists and theories prevail through adherence to said method. By 
way of teachers, media, and other cultural influences, this belief has trickled down into the 
viewpoints of students. Resultingly, the majority of students shun the role of contextual values 
and support the statement that “the best scientists are always very open-minded, logical, 
unbiased, and objective in their work” (Ryan & Aikenhead, 1992, p 568). 
Some feminists, however, embrace those unwanted values that science teachers see as 
subversive to methodological knowledge and not capable of being consistently tested by 
empirical experiments. Alison Jaggar (1998), for instance, holds that emotions are essential 
elements of knowledge construction, play an intentional aspect in judgment making, and 
influence the way we observe the world. Due to their intricate and inseparable link to human 
life, emotions cannot be removed through an appeal to a standardizing method. On the contrary, 
emotions can be constructively used while practicing science. For instance, joy at a discovery 
may lead an inquiry in a new direction or fear may indicate a problem with the study at hand. 
Teachers should encourage students to recognize and respond to these emotions. 
Douglas Allchin (1991) argues that many of our cultural and ethical values may actually 
bolster those of science. He asserts that “some values in science govern how we regulate the 
potentially biasing effect of other values in producing reliable knowledge. Indeed, a diversity of 
values promotes more robust knowledge where they intersect” (p. 1). A chief example of such a 
regulatory value would be a commitment to democratic interaction. Enacting democratic 
dialogue and consensus (albeit temporary) in the classroom, can potentially provide policing of 
harmful biases operating in some inquiry projects. Granted, however, democracy is also capable 
of maintaining those biases as well. When democratic attention is explicitly directed toward 
oppressed, multiple, and diverse perspectives, though, the chances of this problematic 
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maintenance occurring are minimized. Finally this attention shapes the resulting knowledge in 
ways that make it more trustworthy than simply socially constructed science. 
On another note, pragmatist-feminists are concerned with the political nature of science 
and its ability to bring about social change. John Dewey, a key pragmatist educational 
philosopher, strongly supported a contextually immersed notion of the scientific method as a way 
to verify ideas as pragmatically true and ultimately bring about changes needed to adapt to and 
improve the human condition. Within the practice of science, Dewey argued that scientists must 
be honest with their data and must take social factors into consideration, thereby achieving a new 
type of socially conscious objectivity that serves a functional purpose. Unlike many science 
teachers, however, Dewey and James strongly contended that truth is not reached at the 
conclusion of one practice or a certain number of repetitions of a precisely patterned scientific 
method. Instead, the inquiry process must be carried on continually, with constant revision and 
expansion in order to get at a fuller view of lived experience, rather than just partial abstractions 
or collections of facts relevant to technical subject matter. Pragmatists call for praxis between 
these partial bits that can practically help us meet our immediate needs through action and the 
larger theoretical goals of answering enduring (and perhaps unanswerable) questions about life 
through reflection (Rescher, 2000, p. 110). The truths that arise out of this process, then, are 
temporary, falsifiable, and more aligned with goals of improving life. 
Implementing a Redefined Objectivity 
Through this discussion of pragmatist-feminist objections to objectivity conceived as the 
view from nowhere, a new form of objectivity is being shaped. This reformed conception is a 
responsible and socially conscious objectivity that is achieved at the intersection of willfully 
included multiple and diverse perspectives. It is a standpoint employed not in regard to an 
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absolute reality disconnected from human experience, but rather in regard to our everyday, lived 
experience. It is not relativistic in that it allows for and requires judgments to be made about the 
status of life, the trustworthiness of inquiry, and the effects of each scientific endeavor. Because 
of their potential hindrance to improving human life, it calls for a ridding of values that are 
racist, sexist, classist, ageist, gender biased, or based on sexual preference. Thus, it identifies 
and casts out values that do not promote a satisfactory leading, while cherishing those that do. 
Furthermore, this form of objectivity requires the conscious inclusion of oppressed perspectives 
and capitalizes on the insights they may have to offer. It is not a detached objectivity, but rather 
an objectivity that genuinely arises out of and accurately considers our shared, though varied, 
existence. As such, it has a practical and functional value. 
I believe that this pragmatist-feminist objectivity should replace the view from nowhere 
currently employed in many science classrooms. Science, as a content area, should become 
concerned with facts and theories that are pertinent to our continued and improved existence as 
humans rather than a collection of fixed facts seemingly distant from the lives of students 
learning them. The pragmatic truth of these concepts and explanations should be verified 
through scientific experiment met with similar demands from our environment. Hypotheses and 
theories that are not verified as immediately capable of leading to further satisfying experiences 
should be stored for potential future use, but not be labeled true at present. As inquiry, science in 
the classroom should be concerned with problems and issues facing humans, culture, and society, 
especially those of immediate and local importance. This differs from the more positivistic 
objectivity which assigns scientific importance without thorough or, in some cases, even initial 
consideration of the role of humans and their needs. It is in this regard that the feminist, social 
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justice orientation of such inquiry is most clear. As feminist, it is centrally concerned with the 
local problems and the well being of all people, especially minorities or those historically 
oppressed. These guiding concerns extend the pragmatist-feminist framework beyond social 
constructionism. 
The new objectivity should also be both physically and mentally engaging, suggestive of 
the pertinence and importance of participating in such inquiry. It should welcome critique and 
challenging questions regarding its ethical and appropriate use. As an attitude, science should be 
taught as a complex, critical, intricate, and valuable, socially concerned stance. Teachers should 
approach objectivity from a human perspective, rather than one that is disembodied and striving 
toward an impossible knowledge of a detached, absolute world. I will conclude by suggesting 
several curricular and pedagogical approaches to science that I think are well aligned with this 
pragmatist-feminist understanding of objectivity and science as a whole. 
Wolff-Michael Roth and Angela Calabrese Barton have each suggested the use of 
autobiography in the science classroom (2000; 2000). While not explicitly pragmatist-feminists, 
their ideas are in accord with the pragmatist-feminist orientation. Roth argues that 
“autobiography and other first-person methods enacted together with critical doubt are important 
aspects in making rigorous any disciplinary method” (2000, p. 2). This increased rigor is 
evidenced in the intersubjectivity that is arrived at by having all participants in a class put their 
autobiographies out on the table and then striving to interpret each one with respect to the 
scientific inquiries of the class. Roth believes it is necessary to know the autobiography of the 
scientist, as the observer, because her background influences her observations. 
As each person constructs her autobiography, she is able to make herself aware of her 
prejudices, pull them into doubt, and change or eliminate them if needed. Roth insists that an 
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essential aspect of the autobiographical genre is that it is written for “the other” to hear and that 
the other is given the agency of assigning meaning to it. Insofar as people lack ownership of 
language as a whole, “autobiography as written text is therefore also associated with alienation, 
for we always have to use the words which are not entirely our own, but always also belong to 
the Other” (2000, p. 7). In our context, classmates, as others, are assigned the task of translating 
and rearticulating each student’s life story in such a way that critically examines the attitudes, 
beliefs, and experiences that each student brings to the classroom. Of course, students in more 
powerful positions may construct the other as subordinate. Teachers need to be aware of and 
combat this tendency, perhaps by encouraging an ethic of care within this potentially harmful 
situation (Haddock Seigfried, 1996, p. 268). 
A more overtly pragmatic use of autobiography would be to employ it as a tool for 
bringing the habits which constitute one’s self into consciousness so that they can be improved. 
These may be habits of prejudice or habits of distrust of science. Through autobiography, then, 
we shape a new identity for ourselves and for others. When autobiography is constructed in light 
of specific scientific inquiry, we redefine and reposition ourselves as both the subjects and 
objects of science. As embodied beings who cannot achieve observer-independent objectivity, 
we can critically bring together knowledge of our autobiographies and varied perspectives to 
form an inter-subjectivity that avoids relativism and allows for scientific progress. Furthermore, 
a sense of solidarity among the students may be revealed as they discover similarities in their 
experiences with science through the sharing of their stories. 
Angela Calabrese Barton adds that science education reform often calls for a focus on 
“everyday life” (2000, p. 38), but suggests that, through an understanding of the importance of 
autobiography, the focus should really be on lived experience. She notes that examples from 
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“real life” typically used in the science classroom are often geared toward specific experiences of 
privileged males—experiences that fit neatly with the concept being explained. For instance, I 
recall my high school physics teacher explaining velocity derivatives by referring to the flight of 
a model rocket. I had never in my life seen a model rocket and the example had little use for me, 
no matter how accurately the rocket displayed the concept at hand. Autobiographies, however, 
show that lived experience is much more complex, hence, challenging “neat science” (2000, p. 
38). Autobiography, then, can provide the medium for connecting science to such complicated 
lived experience, thereby making science useful in terms of explanation and improving 
environmental conditions. Many teachers claim that science should be similarly student-centered 
(Levitt, 2002), yet they uphold epistemological assumptions in their teaching which promote 
learning that is achieved by students abstracting themselves from their social and historical 
positions and is, therefore, “student-less,” regardless of the rhetoric that masks it. 
Much of Calabrese Barton’s work rests on her understanding of scientific knowledge as 
local and reflexive. Localness is tied to pragmatist-feminism in that local knowledge is 
concerned with the immediate social uses of science and its products. Michael Bryne and Alex 
Johnstone (1987) call for a similar concern with the social uses and effects of science in the 
classroom. They suggest science classes that consider practical problems that may relate to other 
academic subjects, such as social studies, and reflexively deal with pressing issues in that 
community, like the use of birth control. “Consequently we need to provide opportunities for 
students to think about science in the context of wider social, economic, and applied problems, 
and in so doing help them to learn to apply critical standards both in science and in 
sciencerelated 
contexts” (p. 333). Similarly, Donald Oliver suggests what he calls “grounded knowing” 
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in the science classroom. This type of knowing is opposed to technical knowing in that it is a 
deeper, holistic, and more connected way of defining our complex relationships with our culture 
and the natural world. 
All of these social concerns with science coalesce with William Cobern’s (1996) 
promotion of the public understanding of science as based in the public’s legitimate interests in 
science, rather than in the interests of science (p. 12). That is, the public’s ability to use science 
for social purposes, rather than merely as a false way of objectively arriving at a (non-existent) 
absolute reality. I would add that an excellent way to constructively reveal the ever-changing 
purposes and effects of scientific inquiry is through student role-playing. By assuming and 
imagining the role of a beauty product test rabbit, a starving family receiving Golden Rice, or an 
infertile couple undergoing in vitro fertilization, students are able to discover the local and 
humanistic aspects of science as well as envision new uses for science on a global scale. 
Importantly, these roles would be reflexively undertaken with regard to previously shared 
autobiographies, thus challenging and reconfiguring student identities as inquirers. 
Douglas Allchin (1999) suggests that “science teachers who understand the multi-faceted 
relationship between science and values can guide students more effectively in fully appreciating 
the nature of science through reflexive exercises and case studies” (p. 1). Allchin sees the 
classroom as an ideal place where the values and perspectives of many people can be brought 
together, rather than transcended, in a scientific pursuit to form a more robust type of objectivity. 
This bringing together of perspectives, then, requires an open discussion on the part of the 
teacher concerning the shaping role of the values the students bring with them. These values can 
be put to use in objectivity building by pulling them into the critical consciousness of the entire 
class. In a constructivist setting, students can be first asked to reflexively consider those values 
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that they hold and those values supported by the scientific process. Outside and overarching 
values can also be brought into play by the employment of historical case studies in the 
classroom. Being able to reflect on the currently evident consequences of past values in 
scientific inquiry in those case studies will allow for their effects to be clearer for students. Then 
the students and teacher can decide as a community how those values should be objectively dealt 
with as they carry out their scientific inquiry in the present. 
Finally, Maralee Mayberry (2001) suggests a feminist pedagogy, rather than a 
collaborative learning pedagogy, to be used in the science classroom. She charges collaborative 
learning with being “a social reproductive pedagogy that encourages students to gain proficiency 
in the dominant discourse of existing science systems, whereas feminist pedagogy is a socially 
transformative pedagogy that invites students to critically analyze existing science systems and 
their relationship to social oppression and domination” (pp. 145-146). She claims that 
collaborative learning involves a disembodiment from the doer of science in that each student 
becomes abstracted from their socially historical position in order to conform to the discourse 
practices of the dominant group. Here, this would involve both a forced perception and practice 
of an idealized objectivity as a view from nowhere. In feminist pedagogy, one’s embodiedness 
is valued as a part of one’s identity that can be brought forward democratically in a dialogical 
process of scientific inquiry. It should be noted, though, that feminist pedagogy is collaborative 
in the sense that it brings together a diverse and embodied group of learners, typically with at 
least one common concern. This critical pedagogy meshes well with the socially conscious, 
responsible, and embodied pragmatist-feminist conception of objectivity and science for which I 
am arguing. 
In closing, I believe that I have fashioned more robust, practical, and democratically 
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rigorous conceptions of science and objectivity through consideration of pragmatist-feminism. 
Studies have shown that to encourage the participation of all students, especially girls and people 
of color, “science teaching needs to be more concrete, to make connections to lived experience 
of the student, to engage students in social collaboration, and to consider topics of contemporary 
interest (Sanders, Koch & Urso, 1997; Kahle, 1994; Sadker & Sadker, 1994)” (Koch, 2002, p. 
21). The philosophy of science and its corresponding pedagogies described here do just that. 
Objectivity, as I have described it, is applicable to the socially and historically constructed world 
in which we live and its study. Finally, this refashioned objectivity can and should be put to 
work in science classrooms, replacing masculinist, homogenizing, nonsensical, and potentially 
harmful objectivity as the “view from nowhere”. 
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